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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE S. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff"Respondent-
Cross-Petitioner, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant-
Petitioner-Cross Respondent. 
Cert. No. 890145 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. In denying Ms. Sorensen attorneyfs fees for trial 
litigation, does the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals 
on the same issue of law. 
2. In denying Ms. Sorensen attorney's fees for 
appellate litigation, does the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law. 
Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989). 
Jurisdictional Statement 
(a) Petitioner seeks review of the decision, entered 
February 10, 1989, and of the order denying the Petition for 
Rehearing, entered March 23, 1989. 
mb.reLapSbriefjor 
(b) The order denying the Petition for Rehearing was 
entered March 23, 1989• Cross-Petitioner was granted an 
extension of time, to and including June 16, 1989, in which to 
file a Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
(c) The Petition for Rehearing was filed on April 17, 
1989. Cross-Petitioner was granted an extension of time, to and 
including June 16, 1989, in which to file a Cross-Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
(d) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1953). 
RULES DETERMINATIVE OF REVIEW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this Cross-Petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case 
This is an action for divorce and an equitable 
distribution of the marital assets. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Elaine S. Sorensen filed her complaint on March 22, 
1985, in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County. 
The complaint subsequently was amended on March 12, 1986. The 
action was tried by Judge Rodney S. Page, without a jury, on 
October 27 and November 14, 1986. On February 20, 1987, the 
court entered a Decree of Divorce, dissolving the marriage 
between the parties and dividing the marital assets. 
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On Marru ^A -**<*-* rw sorensen appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, Briefs were filed. Oral argument was 
*: I 1111II L ' -
Disposition in the Court Below 
"- i^brn'" ' "its uour*' — ^rvr-^r * \ ^ * \s 
opi.,i^,\. iffirme^ Li^ aut:. J.> Z cour* , i,, . reversed ... ' ,.e 
single issLo or attorney's fees at ti i -* . 
Court fcr .a * w w: ;• <-.-2 '.^  iees on appea le h i.itioi« was :enied -i: 
March "" *-G<-« '*r. Sorensen subequenLiy filed his Petit^c** i~r 
\TEMENT OF FACTS 
"The district - :*.* -I'-trrr a decree of di vorce, 
disso. v i . .i.c ''jjLriuvjc Jjet-Wee/ i uc pu *._ i *--o and J * - iCia n - *- * , ^  
marital assets. ir i - rdered : Sorensf * ^y :.u ;/.:. 
t*r. .icrr-r..' - A , L I no r 3:uc;a oy zr.e cr;;:^'" 
^udq:Tient and K^ !: rcj-^ht an ^r^a"1 to tut It "' Tourt ^f ^ce 3]s. 
n^jLw.Tiucr. .. . . :.. borensen, _ _ former w:r> , was r e ^ . ; 3 
defend the appeal, she aske-i t e Ccurr of Appeals *cr : i<* : of 
f'lii it f orn^ i,1 ' s fi"ii,'^l «Jio iirn'in ri-il MM appi'vi I Hriol ol Respondent, 
at ..j4. - . . 
~-> wi,i : , ] . : ; entered hy the Cc ^ r: , : App* lis reversed 
Eiiisei i, ; 
d.i other issues were affirmed Yhe Cvart'L- opm.cn a:; not 
address the issue oi lees on appeal, accord-nalv Ms. uorensen 
mi ret ipibrief^or «J 
filed a Petition for Rehearing and renewed her request for an 
award of fees and she asked the Court to remand the action to the 
district court for a determination of amount. The Petition was 
denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS SUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE AND BY A STIPULATION AT TRIAL BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES, AND THE COURT OF APPEAL'S REVERSAL OF THE AWARD 
CONFLICTS WITH ITS PRIOR DECISION. 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly noted that "In 
order to recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the moving 
party must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating that the award is 
reasonable, and 2) establishing the financial need of the 
requesting party compels the award." Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 
P.2d 820, 832-833 (Utah App. 1989). The Court determined Ms. 
Sorensen had adequately demonstrated sufficient need, but it 
could not determine whether the award of attorney's fees was 
reasonable. 
The reasonableness of the attorney's fees was 
sufficiently established at trial. On the first morning of 
trial, Ms. Sorensen was examined by her trial counsel, Tim Healy, 
about the attorney's fees she had incurred: 
Q. Is it also correct, Mrs. Sorensen, in this 
particular matter, that you have incurred substantial 
attorney fees in connection with the preparation and 
trial of this case? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And is it correct, Mrs. Sorensen, that those 
attorney fees are in the neighborhood of $3,700.00? 
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*>rr> T^TT*prx: w e 1 ] , I'm going to object, Your 
Honoi . L : i: i.HK. the t i.n'ie— '-*- - r.+rr-* ^ - present 
testimony !?>tpr ^^ ':: 
Mn. nLrtLi . .'. u a : idi ^ : you AOU,. 
have a copy of t K^ rbilli^^^ "tate^ent cr vh. ' 
MR non^rx . -: *e couxa re :;.at statement 
over lunchtime, they shouldn't qi on what it is 
approximate^ chirk i r-o • accept Counsel's 
statements. 
TBr COURT: We) , o * >: about it over lunchtime 
and see i f v • i ecu Id ,i o £ i ^  r * ha t, 
i i -.. it 1 - 5-141 jtp- tnat dr- , Ms Mor^-isen *i- attorney 
I - • ' • . • i/ii J 
statement i : r. fc.x *.n-J so was prepared to testify about the 
under] j n^ ^i^ti f icaticr f^ r- *-'*• — * 
.*;•.. H B A I ^ * : iw«. Jonor, we have a^jo agreea tnat 
1 would proffer to the Court at this t i - * t-- i*-A - >--oV 
fees and state what this is based on. 
asJcec L-Ctiaiivj >„. o stipuid*. t t - - i ne^iy s prof lor. Isc .curt 
did not ask -.IT. tr sr-.pulat^ ^-'it t-h^  t ..?s ^ >-e re. •* =•,-.«*> 
t i . ... :- .
 :- - . •- i • . ; 
cn,y asked r. -::. t:; stipulate thv * ' Heal * were called as a 
w i fress, he would testify his tees were reasonable an* I ti ley 
£:. . .- ~.J awarded * - v- "orensen. The precise exchange between 
the court and Mr.. .c;chard reads: 
THE COURT: Would you stipula te, 1 i:r Echard, that 
if Mr. Healy were to testify, that he would testify 
that his fee in this matter is $3,587.50, in addition 
therewith some witness subpoena fees. The stipulation 
would not go to the question of whether or not they are 
reasonable or whether they should be awarded, but that 
would be his testimony. May :i t be so stipulated? 
MR. ECHARDi It nay, You i • Hone > r. 
mb.rrLaptbriefjor 5 
THE COURT: The Court would receive the 
stipulation for that purpose. Maybe we ought to have 
this [billing statement] marked, Mr. Healy, marked as 
V. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 214-215). (Emphasis Added.) At the close of 
trial, Mr. Healy proffered evidence of additional fees incurred 
in the trial. Mr. Echard stipulated to the proffer with the same 
conditions accepted earlier: 
MR ECHARD: I agreed, Your Honor, that Counsel 
could make a proffer as to attorney fees. I would not 
agree to it, but I would accept it as to what he would 
testify to with that. 
MR. HEALY: These are additional fees in 
connection with the further Hearing. 
THE COURT: That [a second billing statement] is 
Exhibit X, and the Court will accept that as a proffer 
of additional fees in this matter. 
(Tr. Vol. II at 171). (Emphasis added.) Mr. Healy offered two 
billing statements as exhibits (Tr. Exs. V and X). They describe 
the work he performed, the hours expended, and the hourly rates 
charged. He was prepared to testify about them, but Mr. Echard 
stipulated to the substance of his testimony. Although he did 
not stipulate to the truth of Mr. Healyfs testimony, Mr. Echard 
did stipulate that Mr. Healy would testify, if necessary, to the 
reasonableness of the fees. Because Mr. Echard neither cross-
examined Mr. Healy nor offered contrary evidence on the issue, 
Dr. Sorensen cannot now complain of the reasonableness. 
The Court of Appeals, in denying Ms. Sorensen!s award 
of attorney fees stated: "No evidence was presented relating to 
the reasonableness of the number of hours, the usual hourly rate 
mb TzLaplbncfjor 6 
it ] actually incorrect, : uf ficient ev , denct' existed to support a 
findi^n *"**t ^^a^c^^b'^p.os^ M^^,~>vr.~ - , «*-.! incorrect , 
..•j.^idi. ., nauqnan, , >n <\t • ^ ^:~. 
strikingly similar ^ this one and entered culv twelve days 
] a t ^  r - j ; - c 
ol :M:-£ic; o iv-.^. ,,*. < : , A simila. proach was approved 
in Newmeyer v. Newmeye^. -* - - 1'~^  >^ +-~^  i«% = • -urh;3:?, 
*- t.r. '•. . d 
circumstances, M s . Sorensen should be awarded attorney's fees. 
llm B Y D E N Y I N G MS. SORENSEN AN' AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR 
DEFENDING THE APPEAL, THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION 
CONFLICTS WITH ITS PRIOR DECISION. 
Dr. Clifford Sorensen was; unwilling to abid^ bv the 
cij.t = aecree oi ai^c^n* .vas upheld DV ; ho curt ci Appeals on 
every Issue ^xc^nt on^* TH^*- v.^ >-t- ^ #= +
 M- decree vhich • rdered 
I . .; orensen ^ '. r-.i. : . - s . 
Tha* :s 3 substantial modification J£ the decree. Ms. 
Sor^nr;^" i& cie - * sli wvis ir'i-qn i i i u I In 
defend the appe... , .^..^  ; , . record demonstrates her financial 
need. Under identical circumstances ir Mauqhan, supra the Court 
of ft ppea] i" ' ' • - - - a 
c o n f l i c t b e i A t i - , ^a:n . : - . . . . : he :ou r .: r.ne -3/ne ..-foiie. 
mb, trl aplb rief^or 7 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Sorensen asks the Court (i) to grant the Cross-
Petition for Writ of Certiorari; (ii) to award her the costs she 
has incurred in this proceeding; and (iii) to award her 
attorney's fees she has incurred in this proceeding. 
DATED: June 16, 1989. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
By 
Reid E. Lewis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Elaine S. Sorensen 
mb relapibnefjor 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 16, 1989, I mailed four 
copies of the Cross-Petition To the Supreme Court of Utah for 
Writ of Certiorari to: 
Kent M. Kasting 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Elaine S. SORENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Clifford G. SORENSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870102-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 10, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied March 23, 1989. 
Husband appealed from divorce judg-
ment of the Second District Court, Davis 
County, Rodney S. Page, J., distributing 
marital property. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that* (1) goodwill of hus-
band's solo dental practice was marital as-
set properly subject to equitable distribu-
tion, and (2) trial court improperly awarded 
wife attorney fees since there was no proof 
of reasonableness of fees incurred. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part 
Jackson, J., concurred in part and dis-
sented in part and filed an opinion. 
1. Divorce <s=*286(5) 
In divorce proceeding, determining and 
assigning values to marital property is mat-
ter for trial court and appellate court will 
disturb those determinations absent show-
ing of clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Trial «=>139.1(3), 14<K1) 
Assessing weight and credibility of ex-
pert witness testimony is matter for trier 
of fact 
3. Divorce <£=>252.3(1) 
Goodwill of husband's solo dental prac-
tice was marital asset subject to valuation 
and equitable distribution in divorce action. 
4. Divorce <$=»253(3) 
Evaluation of goodwill attributable to 
one party's business for purposes of mak-
ing equitable distribution is question of 
fact and is dependent on particular circum-
stances of case; in order to establish good-
will of divorcing spouse's professional prac-
tice as marital asset, party must produce 
sufficient expert testimony to show that 
goodwill constitutes valued business asset, 
independent of continued presence of pro-
fessional spouse, and trial courts may con-
sider any legitimate valuation method that 
measures present value of goodwill by tak-
ing into account past results and not post-
marital efforts of professional spouse. 
5. Divorce <&=»253(4) 
In making equitable distribution of 
goodwill in divorce proceeding, trial court 
should make specific findings, first indicat-
ing whether goodwill exists under particu-
lar circumstances of case, and if so, its 
value; finding should clearly state evidence 
upon which valuations are based, and pref-
erably, valuation method or methods on 
which court relied. 
6. Divorce <*=>253(3) 
One factor that clearly should not be 
considered in valuation of goodwill of pro-
fessional spouse's practice for purposes of 
equitable distribution is professional 
spouse's future-earning capacity. 
7. Appeal and Error ^1008.1(4) 
Trial court's fundamental role in adver-
sary process is to judge credibility of wit-
nesses, and he or she is free to choose 
among expert testimony; appellate court 
will give weight to fact that trial court 
observed witnesses and their manner of 
testifying and accepted one version of facts 
rather than opposite. 
8. Evidence <*=>572 
Valuation of $62,000 placed on good-
will of husband's dental practice for pur-
poses of equitable distribution was suffi-
ciently supported by testimony of wife's 
expert, who was employed by brokerage 
firm that had been in business over 18 
years and sold more than 250 dental prac-
tices and who had personally been involved 
in 12 appraisals and six sales of practices; 
expert derived goodwill figure by consider-
ing factors such as history of earnings, 
length of time husband had been in prac-
tice, number of patients, location of prac-
tice, facilities and equipment, accounts re-
ceivable, and transferability of profits to 
prospective buyer, goodwill value ex-
SORENSEN v. 
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pressed as factor equaling 34% of gross 
receipts was on low end of scale for dental 
practices in state, and husband's expert 
who attempted to rebut testimony was not 
involved in sale and valuation of dental 
practices. 
9. Divorce <£=>253(3) 
Trial court properly considered ac-
counts receivable in valuing husband's den-
tal practice for purposes of equitable distri-
bution. 
10. Divorce <3=»286<9) 
Even assuming that trial court failed 
to consider full amount of accounts payable 
in its valuation of husband's dental practice 
for purposes of equitable distribution, such 
mistake was harmless error considering 
that both parties to action were awarded 
approximately $131,000 in marital assets 
and that property distributions in divorce 
actions were not required to be equal, but 
rather equitable. 
11. Divorce <*=*226 
In order to recover attorney fees in 
divorce action, moving party must set forth 
evidence demonstrating that award is rea-
sonable, and establishing financial need of 
requesting party. 
12. Divorce <s=*226 
Trial court improperly awarded wife 
attorney fees in divorce action, as there 
was no evidence offered regarding "reason-
ableness of fees" charged; wife's attorney 
proffered exhibit reflecting only time spent 
and rates charged, and there was no evi-
dence relating to reasonableness of number 
of hours, usual hourly rate for divorce 
cases in community nor overall reasonable-
ness of fee. 
13. Divorce <s=*227(l) 
Trial court properly required husband 
to pay portion of fee for expert appraiser 
which was in excess of statutory rate, as 
parties had agreed by pretrial stipulation to 
have their real property appraised by ex-
pert and further agreed that his fee would 
be paid initially by husband with ultimate 
responsibility for payment to be deter-
mined by trial court U.C.A.1953, 21-5-
4(1). 
SORENSEN Utah 821 
(UtjJiApp. 1989) 
Kent Kasting, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant 
Reid E. Lewis and Jeffrey Robinson, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent 
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
In this divorce action, defendant/appel-
lant, Clifford G. Sorensen ("Dr. Sorensen") 
appeals the trial court's property valuation 
and distribution, award of attorney fees to 
Mrs. Sorensen, and the allocation of expert 
witness fees. We affirm the property dis-
tribution and allocation of expert witness 
fees but reverse the award of attorney 
fees. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on April 10, 
1975. Mrs. Sorensen was a registered 
nurse. Dr. Sorensen was a dentist and had 
practiced in Roy, Utah for approximately 
six years prior to the marriage. The par-
ties have four children, ages 10, 9, 6, and 3 
at the time of trial. There is no dispute as 
to custody, child support, or alimony. 
During the marriage, Dr. Sorensen con-
tinued to practice as a dentist in Roy. Mrs. 
Sorensen returned to school and received 
her masters degree in nursing and also 
completed all the necessary courses for a 
Ph.D. in public health. 
At trial, Mrs. Sorensen claimed Dr. Sor-
ensen's dental practice, a professional cor-
poration, was a marital asset subject to 
valuation and distribution by the court 
Mrs. Sorensen called Dr. Richard Austin as 
an expert witness. Dr. Austin had been a 
dentist in Utah for four and one-half years. 
Dr. Austin also worked for a Denver com-
pany that brokered the purchase and sale 
of dental practices. His brokerage compa-
ny had appraised and sold approximately 
250 dental practices. Dr. Austin had par-
ticipated in 12 appraisals and 7 sales of 
dentistry practices. Six of the 7 sales oc-
curred in the Salt Lake City area. 
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Dr. Austin testified that the fair market 
value of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice was 
$100,060 and that dental practices in Utah 
generally sold for 90 to 95 percent of their 
appraised value. In connection with his 
testimony, Dr. Austin presented the trial 
court his written valuation of Dr. Soren-
sen's dental practice. Dr. Austin's valua-
tion was based on unaudited information 
previously provided by Dr. Sorensen 
through discovery. Dr. Austin's calcula-
tion was the combined value of three com-
ponents: 1) tangible assets, Lc, furniture 
and equipment—$15,330, 2) accounts re-
ceivable—$22,170,* and 3) intangible assets 
or "goodwiH"--$62,560, for a total market 
value of $100,060. Dr. Austin further tes-
tified "[Fjt is important to realize that this 
evaluation has been made [according to] 
the standards that are currently acceptable 
for this purpose. Existing market trends 
in the state of Utah for the disposition of 
dental practices were given consideration." 
To determine the goodwill value, Dr. 
Austin reviewed the income and expenses 
of Dr. Sorensen's practice for a three year 
period, 1983 through 1985. During this 
time, Dr. Sorensen averaged $184,000 in 
gross receipts. Dr. Austin testified that 
the "goodwill" value of dental practices he 
had appraised in Utah ranged from 15 to 80 
percent of their gross receipts depending 
on a number of factors. These factors 
include: the length the practice had been 
operating, location, number of patients, 
profitability, currency of accounts receiva-
ble, and an evaluation of the transferability 
of profit to a prospective buyer. Applying 
the foregoing factors to Dr. Sorensen's 
practice, Dr. Austin concluded the goodwill 
value was 34 percent of the gross receipts 
for a total of $62,560. Specifically, Dr. 
Austin testified: 
The age of a dental practice plays an 
important role in deterniining its value. 
Dr. Sorensen has been practicing in the 
community for a number of years and 
has established a good reputation for 
family dental care. The number of pa-
1. To arrive at a dollar value attributable to 
accounts receivable, Dr. Austin excluded all ac-
counts unpaid over 120 days, and discounted 
tients of record and the maintenance of 
healthy production figures attest to this. 
Dr. Sorensen's practice location is on a 
very highly traveled street and is in an 
excellent location for visibility and public 
exposure. Parking is convenient The 
office space is adequate and functional. 
However, updating equipment and lease-
hold improvements would increase the 
value of this practice. 
The aging of the accounts receivable indi-
cates that the practice has a healthy col-
lection policy and that the receptionist is 
doing a good job of collecting. 
The community of Roy has a healthy, 
growing economy. The influx of new 
dentists into the area quickly absorbs 
patients seeking new dentists. 
In response to Dr. Austin's testimony, 
Dr. Sorensen called two expert witnesses: 
Mr. Gerald Deters, his accountant, and Mr. 
Roger Nuttal, a CPA. Mr. Deters com-
pared the respective income, expenses, and 
profit of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice for 
the years 1974 and 1986, and concluded 
that since the date of the marriage, Dr. 
Sorensen's practice was "a little bit bigger, 
a little better." Mr. Deters further testi-
fied that goodwill had never been shown as 
an asset of Dr. Sorensen's professional cor-
poration. 
Dr. Sorensen also called Mr. Roger Nut-
tal, who evaluated the Sorensen's entire 
financial situation, both business and per-
sonal. Mr. Nuttal testified that he believed 
some goodwill existed, but found Dr. Aus-
tin's calculations "very questionable." He 
further testified that Dr. Austin failed to 
consider $10,129 in accounts payable. 
Thereafter, relying primarily on Dr. Aus-
tin's calculations less the amount for ac-
counts payable, Mr. Nuttal testified that 
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice was worth 
approximately $87,096. 
With reference to the dental practice, the 
trial court concluded with our emphasis: 
[Defendant has continued to practice 
dentistry in Roy, Utah, during the course 
of the marriage and has an office with an 
the resulting amount by 12 percent to account 
for uncoilectibles. 
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excellent location; has continued to build 
his clientele; has a good fee collection 
record and a good reputation in the com-
munity. 
The Court finds the total value of the 
practice to be $100,000 including ac-
counts receivable and all equipment with 
the exception of the computer. 
That dental practices usually sell for ap-
proximately 90 percent of the appraised 
value 
The defendant should be awarded the 
dental practice including all equipment 
and accounts receivable the Court feel-
ing that the large portion of the value 
of the practice has to do unth good will 
and reputation built up in the practice 
over the years of marriage. The only 
reasonable way to value said practice is 
to proportion it based upon the years the 
parties have been married during the 
practice. Based on their eleven years of 
marriage over sixteen years of practice 
for the purpose of distribution, the Court 
values the practice at 69 percent of the 
value as found above for a total of $62,-
100. 
The trial court then ordered essentially 
an equal division of the parties' property 
crediting $62,100 to Dr. Sorensen for his 
practice and an equal amount of offsetting 
property to Mrs. Sorensen. 
The trial court also ordered Dr. Sorensen 
to contribute $2,000 toward Mrs. Soren-
sen's attorney fees. Mrs. Sorensen testi-
fied she had incurred fees, but she had no 
present income to pay those fees. Mrs. 
Sorensen's attorney proffered an exhibit 
reflecting the time spent and the rates 
charged. Dr. Sorensen's counsel stipulated 
that the proffer could be received but ex-
pressly refused to stipulate that the fees 
were reasonable. 
The trial court also ordered the parties to 
bear the expense of their own expert wit-
nesses, with the exception of Allan Heiska-
nen, a real estate appraiser, whose fees the 
parties were ordered to split The Soren-
sens, by pretrial stipulation, agreed to have 
their real property appraised by Mr. Heis-
kanen. The stipulation provided that the 
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expense of the appraiser was to be paid 
initially by Dr. Sorensen with the ultimate 
responsibility for payment to be deter-
mined by the trial court 
Dr. Sorensen raises three issues on ap-
peal. First, he claims the trial court erred 
in its valuation of his dental practice by, 1) 
determining that "goodwill" was a marital 
asset subject to equitable distribution, 2) 
including Dr. Sorensen's accounts receiva-
ble in the valuation of the dental practice, 
and 3) failing to consider accounts payable 
in its evaluation of the practice. Second, 
Dr. Sorensen claims the trial court erred in 
awarding Mrs. Sorensen a portion of her 
attorney fees. Finally, Dr. Sorensen 
claims the trial court erred by ordering him 
to pay a portion of Mr. Heiskanen's expert 
witness fee. 
I. VALUATION OF DENTAL 
PRACTICE 
[1,2] In a divorce proceeding, "deter-
mining and assigning values to marital 
property is a matter for the trial court and 
this Court will not disturb those determina-
tions absent a showing of clear abuse of 
discretion." Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 
84 (Utah CtApp.1987). "In making such 
orders, the trial court is permitted broad 
latitude, and its judgment is not to be light-
ly disturbed, so long as it exercises its 
discretion in accordance with the standards 
set by this Court" Nevrmeyer v. Newmey-
er, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987) (cita-
tions omitted). An appealing party bears 
the burden of establishing that the trial 
court violated those standards "or that the 
trial court's factual findings upon which 
the [property] division is grounded are 
clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a)." Id. Furthermore, as-
sessing the weight and credibility of expert 
witness testimony is a matter for the trier 
of fact See Yelderman v. Yelderman, 
669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) ("it is within 
the province of the fact finder to believe 
those witnesses or evidence it chooses"). 
Goodvrill 
[3] In its property distribution, the trial 
court credited Dr. Sorensen with $62,100 
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which represents the trial court's assess-
ment of the total value of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice. As part of its calculations, 
the trial court assigned a substantial value 
to the goodwill of Dr. Sorensen's profes-
sional dental corporation. On appeal, we 
must first determine whether goodwill is 
properly considered a marital asset subject 
to distribution, and if so, whether there is 
competent evidence to support the trial 
court's finding as to the goodwill value of 
Dr. Sorensen's professional corporation. 
In a divorce action, trial courts should 
distribute marital property and income in 
order that "the parties may readjust then-
lives to their new circumstances as well as 
possible." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 PJ2d 
1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
"[M]arital property 'encompasses all of the 
assets of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenever obtained and from what-
ever source derived. . . . ' " Id. at 1079 (ci-
tation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court 
has emphasized: 
[WJhether a resource is subject to distri-
bution does not turn on whether the 
spouse can presently use or control it, or 
on whether the resource can be given a 
present dollar value. The essential cri-
terion is whether a right to the benefit 
or asset has accrued in whole or in part 
during the marriage. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 
432-33 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
The question of whether the goodwill of 
a professional corporation is a marital as-
set, properly subject to equitable distribu-
tion in a divorce action, is one of first 
impression for this Court,2 although the 
Utah Supreme Court recently addressed 
2. In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 ?J2d 952 (Utah CL 
App.1983), Judge Jackson, writing for this 
Court, found that the appellant confused "good-
will" with "going concern value," and failed to 
prove the existence of goodwill by competent 
evidence. Id. at 956-57. 
3. See, e.g., Hostel v. Rostel, 622 P.2d 429 (Alaska 
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 749 ?2d 343 
(Alaska 1988) (close corporation—husband and 
wife sole shareholders); Mitchell v. Mitchell 152 
Ariz. 317, 732 ?2d 208 (1987) (partnership); 
Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194. 741 S.WJ2d 640 
(1987) (professional corporation); In re Mar-
rino* ni Wsttt* 171 Pal Ann 1A IJCA 717 r*\ Qnh-
the issue indirectly in Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner, 
the trial court awarded Dr. Gardner his 
retirement account and medical assets 
without assigning them a present value. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's decision, and remanded for further 
proceedings for a valuation of the medical 
assets and retirement account In consid-
ering the valuation and distribution of the 
doctor's medical assets, the Court stated 
"[t]he ability of a business to generate 
income from its continued patronage is 
commonly referred to as good will. Good 
will is properly subject to equitable dis-
tribution upon divorce." Id at 1080 n. 1 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
dissent chastises us for our reliance on the 
language hi Gardner claiming Justice 
Stewart intended to limit his endorsement 
of goodwill as a marital asset to multi-
membered professional corporations. 
However, Justice Stewart does not make a 
distinction as to the "type" of business 
entity and in fact, in Gardner, the Utah 
Supreme Court relied on Dugan v. Dugan, 
92 N J . 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983), and In re 
Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 324, 588 
P.2d 1136 (1979), to support its conclusion 
that the goodwill of a professional corpora-
tion is subject to distribution in a divorce 
proceeding. See Gardner, 748 P.2d at 
1080 n. 1. Both decisions involved solely 
owned or operated professional practices. 
The prevailing view among 20 other jur-
isdictions is that the goodwill of a profes-
sional practice or business is a marital as-
set; subject to valuation, and therefore, 
should be considered in a divorce proceed-
ing.3 Jurisdictions holding to the contrary 
301 (1985) (professional corporation); In re 
Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 P_2d 
1314 (1979) (professional association); Wright 
v. Wright, 469 kJLd 803 (Del.Fam.CL 1983) (sole 
practitioner); In re Marriage of White, 98 III. 
AppJd 380, 53 IlLDec 786, 424 N.E^d 421 
(1981) (professional corporation); Heller v. Hel-
ler, 672 S.WJd 945 (Ky.CtApp.1984) (profes-
sional corporation); Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 
148 Mich_App. 151, 384 N.W2d 112 (1986) (pro-
fessional corporation); Roth v. Roth, 406 N.W. 
2d 77 (Minn.CLApp. 1987) (sole practitioner); 
Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W^d 429 (Mo. 1987) 
(partnership); In re Marriage of Hull 712 P.2d 
1 1 1 7 r\A^n* l O f l A \ r n r ^ f M - e i ^ n o l ^ T - r ~ % r - o * ^ « \ . 
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include Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Penn-
sylvania, Wisconsin, Texas, and Tennes-
see.4 
The most common legal definition de-
scribes "goodwill" as: 
(T]he advantage or benefit, which is ac-
quired by an establishment, beyond the 
mere value of the capital, stock, funds, 
or property employed therein, in conse-
quence of the general public patronage 
and encouragement which it receives 
from constant or habitual customers, on 
account of its local position, or common 
celebrity, or reputation for skill or afflu-
ence, or punctuality, or from other acci-
dental circumstances or necessities, or 
even from ancient partialities or preju-
dices.5 
Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721. 386 N.W.2d 851 
(1986) (professional corporation); Dugart v. Du-
gan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983) (sole practi-
tioner); Hertz v. Hertz. 99 NJM. 320. 657 P.2d 
1169 (1983) (professional corporation); Dorton 
v. Dorton, TJ N.C.App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 
(1985); Jondahl v. Jondahl 344 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 
1984) (sole practitioner); In re Marriage of Reel-
ing, 66 OnApp. 284. 673 ?2d 1360 (1983) (sole 
practitioner); Fait v. Fait, 345 N.W2d 872 (SJX 
1984) (professional association); In re Marriage 
of Hallt 103 Wash.2d 236. 692 R2d 175 (1984) 
(professional corporation). 
4. See, eg., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456. 648 
P.2d 218 (1982); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So.2d 
108 (La.Ct.App. 1986) (expert testimony failed to 
prove sole proprietorship had goodwill value); 
Carter v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1981); Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa-Super. 20. 518 
A^d 545 (1986); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 
2d 327. 309 N.W.2d 343 (Ct.App.1981); Nail v. 
Nail 486 S.WJd 761 (Tex.1972) (no goodwill in 
sole proprietorship). But see Geesbreght v. 
Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.CivJVpp.1978) 
(goodwill of professional corporation is marital 
asset). See also, Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn.Ct-App.1985). 
5. Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing 
Professional Goodwill or Community Property at 
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TuLL. 
Rev. 313, 314 (1981) (quoting J. Story. Commen-
taries on the Law of Partnerships § 99, at 170 
(6th ed. 1868)). See also Hanson v. Hanson, 
Mitchell v. Mitchell: The Division of Professional 
Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 11 Harv. 
Women's LJ. 147, 149 (1988); and Jackson v. 
Caldwell 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667, 670 
(1966). 
6. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 1, 4 
(1983) (quoting J.M. Smith and K.F. Skousen, 
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In the accounting field, goodwill is re-
ferred to generally as " 'the summation of 
all the special advantages, not otherwise 
identifiable, related to a going concern. It 
includes such items as a good name, capa-
ble staff and personnel, high credit stand-
ing, reputation for superior products and 
services, and favorable location.'"* 
'There can be no doubt that goodwill 
exists. It is a legally protectable inter-
est"7 Goodwill has been held to consti-
tute "property" within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment due process clause8 
and is subject to being bought and sold.* 
Goodwill may be present whether the busi-
ness form is a sole proprietorship, partner-
ship,1* association, joint venture, or corpo-
ration.11 
Intermediate Accounting 283 (7th ed. standard 
vol. 1982)). 
7. Dugan, 457 A^d at 4. 
8. McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 F.Supp. 855, 
857 (D. Wash. 1933) (and citations therein). 
9. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81. 415 P.2d 
667, 670 (1966). 
10. In Mitchell v. Mitchell the Arizona Supreme 
Court noted that there is confusion in this area 
of the law, partly because the analysis of wheth-
er goodwill should be considered an asset often 
involves the dissolution of a partnership which 
is sometimes controlled by a partnership agree-
ment, as opposed to the dissolution of a mar-
riage. 152 Ariz. 317. 732 P.2d 208. 211 (1987). 
The Arizona Court described the dissolution of a 
marriage as follows: 
A professional practice goes automatically to 
the spouse licensed to practice it. He is not 
selling out or liquidating, but continuing in 
business. Effectively, it is the case of the 
silent partner withdrawing from a going busi-
ness. And, if such partner is to receive fair 
compensation for her share, or her enforced 
retirement, it should be so evaluated. 
Id. 
Such is the case in Jackson v. Caldwell au-
thority relied on by Dr. Sorensen for the propo-
sition that goodwill should not be considered 
marital property subject to distribution in di-
vorce proceedings. See Jackson, 415 ?J.d at 
670-71. 
11. See, e.g., Dugan, 457 A.2d at 4; Mitchell 732 
P.2d at 210-11; Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 
947 (Ky.CtJVpp.1984); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 
S.W.2d 429, 435 (Mo.1987). 
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The overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions considering the issue find that good-
will is a property interest, and as such, it 
must be considered in divorce proceedings. 
Whether goodwill exists and has value in a 
particular case, is a question of fact. Ac-
cordingly, we agree with the majority of 
jurisdictions and the dicta in Gardner v. 
Gardner, and hold that the goodwill of a 
professional practice is a marital asset sub-
ject to valuation and distribution in the 
appropriate circumstances. 
Judge Jackson, in his dissent, criticizes 
the approach taken by the Washington and 
California courts in valuing goodwill before 
they address whether it exists at all. 
Judge Jackson adamantly asserts that any 
approach to valuing goodwill should in-
volve a two-step inquiry: does goodwill ex-
ist in this particular entity, and if so, what 
is its value. Although some courts do go 
directly to the valuation issue, a conclusion 
that a value exists implicitly answers the 
first inquiry in the affirmative. More im-
portantly, however, we think our opinion 
clearly directs trial courts to engage in the 
two-part approach. 
We concede that there is a split of au-
thority on this issue, but we find those 
jurisdictions holding to the contrary unper-
suasive. Courts that refuse to recognize 
goodwill as a marital asset base their con-
clusions, generally, on three grounds. 
First, opponents contend that goodwill is 
not an asset separate and apart from the 
individual practitioner and in this respect, 
goodwill is analogous to a professional de-
gree.12 Second, they claim that goodwill is 
12. See Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan.App.2d 456. 
648 P.2d 218, 223 (1982); HoWrook v. Hotbrook, 
103 Wisld 327, 309 N.WJtd 343, 354 (CLApp. 
1981); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 
1972). 
13. See Powell, 648 ?2d at 223; Hotbrook, 309 
N.WJd at 354; NaO, 486 S.W.2d at 764. 
14. See, e.g„ Hotbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 354. 
15. See, e.g^ Mitchell v. Mitchell 152 Ariz. 317, 
732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987); In re Marriage of 
Nichols, 43 CoIoApp. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315 
(1979); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945. 948 
(Ky.CLApp.1984); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 
457 A2d 1, 6 (1983). 
indistinguishable from future earning ca-
pacity and is valuable to the individual only 
to the extent that it assures substantial 
earnings in the future.13 Finally, oppo-
nents assert that goodwill is difficult to 
value, hence it should not be considered in 
divorce settlements.14 We address each of 
these arguments separately. 
In Hotbrook v. Hotbrook, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court expressed the view that 
goodwill does not "bestow on those who 
have an ownership interest in the business, 
an actual, separate property interest" 103 
Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp. 
1982). Accordingly, the Wisconsin Court 
determined that goodwill is more analogous 
to a professional degree than a property 
interest IdL 
We disagree with Wisconsin's rationale. 
There are significant and distinctive differ-
ences between the goodwill of a profession-
al practice and a professional degree.15 
Unlike a professional degree, goodwill is 
traditionally defined as an intangible 
"property right" 1C It is a separate and 
distinct asset, not merely a factor contribu-
ting to the earning capacity of the practi-
tioner. See In re Marriage of Hall, 103 
Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175,178 (1984). The 
theory underlying goodwill is that an on-
going business has a value beyond mere 
tangible assets. These intangible assets 
are independent of the proprietor, and as 
such, can be sold on an open market In re 
Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 
P.2d 1314, 1315 (1979). In Nichols, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals stated: 
16. See, eg., In re Marriage of Nichols, 606 P2d 
at 1315. In addition to those authorities hold-
ing that goodwill is a marital asset, see note 3, 
supra, even those jurisdictions holding to the 
contrary, nonetheless find that good will is a 
property interest See, e,g., Powell v. Powell, 231 
Kan. 456, 648 V2d 218. 222 (1982); Nail v. Nail, 
486 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex.1972); Beasley v. Beas-
ley, 518 A-2d 545. 552 (Pa-Super. 1986); Pearce v. 
Pearce 482 So.2d 108. I l l (La.CLApp.1986). In-
stead, these cases typically find that the particu-
lar facts did not demonstrate that the goodwill 
had value, and therefore, goodwill per se should 
not be considered a marital asset. See Powell 
648 P.2d at 222-24; Nail, 486 S.W.2d at 764; 
Beasley, 518 A-2d at 552; Pearce, 482 So.2d at 
111. 
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While we recognize that professional 
goodwill is not an asset which has an 
independent market value, it can, in con-
junction with the assets of the practice, 
be sold. This limited marketability dis-
tinguishes professional goodwill from the 
advanced educational degree, which, be-
cause it is personal to its holder and is 
non-transferable, [is] held not to be prop-
erty 
Id. 
When goodwill exists, it may well be 
regarded as "the most lucrative asset of 
some enterprises." n 
It is the property attributes of goodwill 
that distinguish it from a professional de-
gree, which we have held on prior occasions 
does not constitute marital property sub-
ject to distribution.18 
Several courts have found that "[tjhe 
better analogy is to pension rights which 
are marital property." Mitchell v. Mitch-
ell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987) 
(and citations therein). Both are property 
rights acquired during the marriage al-
though their enjoyment and benefits are 
deferred. Id. Our Supreme Court has 
stated that marital property encompasses 
pension funds. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988); Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982). 
In Woodward, the Court declared with 
our emphasis: 
[Appellant's] argument fails to recognize 
that pension or retirement benefits are a 
17. Dugan, 457 KJ.d at 5. See also In re Marriage 
of Goger, 27 OrJVpp. 729, 557 P.2d 46. 47 (1976). 
18. See Raybwm v. Rayburn, 738 P-2d 238 (Utah 
CLApp.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 
(Utah CLApp.1987). In Petersen, we held that 
an educational degree is not encompassed with-
in the broad views of the concept of "property." 
It does not have an exchange value or any 
objective transferable value on an open mar-
ket. It is personal to the holder. It termi-
nates on death of the holder and is not inheri-
table. It cannot be assigned, sold, transfer-
red, conveyed, or pledged It is simply an 
intellectual achievement that may potentially 
assist in the future acquisition of property. 
In our view it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term.' 
737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Marriage of Gra-
ham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 ?2d 75, 77 (1978)). 
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form of deferred compensation by the 
employer. If the rights to those benefits 
are acquired during the marriage, then 
the court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distri-
bution of the marital assets. The right 
(emphasis in the original) to receive mo-
nies in the future is unquestionably . . . 
an economic resource, subject to eq-
uitable distribution based upon proper 
computation of its present dollar val-
ue.' » 
Similarly, if goodwill can be shown by 
competent credible evidence to exist at the 
time of dissolution and that it was acquired 
or accrued during the marriage, trial courts 
must "at least consider those benefits in 
making an equitable distribution of the 
marital assets." Id. See also In re Mar-
riage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. 58, 68 (1974). 
The second major criticism of treating 
goodwill as a marital asset is that goodwill 
is indistinguishably tied to personal future 
earnings. Thus, if the practitioner dies or 
retires, "nothing remains." *° 
We believe to the contrary. We note at 
the outset, that goodwill is and must be 
distinguished from a professional practi-
tioner's future earning capacity, an issue 
more fully addressed below. A number of 
jurisdictions have held that goodwill is not, 
however, per se synonymous with future 
earning capacity.21 
In addition to those jurisdictions, one 
commentator opined that "[tjhere is no val-
19. Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432 (quoting Kikkert 
v. Kikkert, 177 NJ-Super. 471, 427 A-2d 76, 78 
(1981), quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 NJ. 464. 
375 A~2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88 NJ. 4, 438 
KJ.d 317 (1981). 
2 a Powell v. Powell 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218, 
223 (1982). See also, Hotbrook v. Hotbrook, 103 
Wis^d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CLApp.1981) 
(goodwill is valuable only to the extent that it 
assures continued substantial future earnings). 
21. See, e.g„ Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 
JL2d 1. 6 (1983); In re Marriage of Lopez 38 
CaLApp3d 93, 113 CaLRptr. 5S, 67 (1974); In re 
Marriage of Hall, 103 Washed 236, 692 P.2d 
175, 178 (1984). 
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id basis for the argument that since good-
will is essentially a measure of future earn-
ings, it cannot properly be treated as a 
marital asset " 2 Valuation and Dis-
tribution of Marital Property, § 23.05(2] 
at 23-69 (1988). The commentator further 
declared that "[i]t is an economic truism 
that the value of any income-producing as-
set is its capacity to produce future income. 
In this regard, goodwill is just like any 
other asset Goodwill differs only insofar 
as, unlike a stock or bond, it will not pro-
duce income by itself." Id 
The argument that goodwill disappears 
in a case where the practitioner dies or 
retires is also unpersuasive. The possibili-
ty of continued patronage, despite the ab-
sence of the selling practitioner, has 
present value to a prospective buyer of a 
professional practice. See In re Marriage 
of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 P.2d 
1314, 1315 (1979). Moreover, the value of 
goodwill frequently remains notwithstand-
ing the practitioner's death, resignation, or 
disability. See In re Marriage of White, 
98 Ill.App.3d 380, 53 Ill.Dec. 786, 789, 424 
N.E.2d 421, 424 (1981). "If it were other-
wise, we are unable to conceive the basis 
for the popular practice of retaining the 
names of deceased or withdrawn members 
in many professional firms long after their 
death or withdrawal." Id The possibility 
of death or retirement of the practitioner 
may reduce the value of goodwill, but it 
does not in all circumstances eliminate its 
existence. In re Marriage of Hall, 103 
Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 178 (1984). 
When a professional retires or dies, his 
earning capacity also either retires or 
dies. Nevertheless, the goodwill that 
once attached to his practice may contin-
ue in existence in the form of established 
patients or clients, referrals, trade name, 
location and associations which now at-
tach to former partners or buyers of the 
practice [A] professional can trans-
port all of his skill (earning rapacity) to a 
new town, but patients or clients, reputa-
tion and referrals (goodwill) cannot al-
ways be transported. 
IdL If the facts in a particular case demon-
strate that there is no goodwill value re-
maining in the absence of the practitioner, 
then a trial court may properly declare in 
its determination of a practice's worth, that 
there is no value attributable to goodwill. 
The third and most unpersuasive argu-
ment is that goodwill is difficult to value, 
therefore, it should not be considered in the 
distribution of marital assets. See, e.g., 
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 
N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp.1981). This also 
seems to be the position taken by the dis-
sent 
We concede that in some cases, valuing 
goodwill is difficult Even so, if a party's 
expert witness cannot adequately demon-
strate that goodwill has a present value, 
then there is simply an evidentiary defect 
and goodwill should not be considered. 
However, the mere fact that goodwill may 
be difficult to value or elusive in nature, 
does not justify ignoring or disregarding it 
altogether in the valuation of marital prop-
erty. In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. 
App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1980); 
MiUhell v. MiUhell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 
P.2d 208, 211 (1987). As in MiUhell, "[w]e 
prefer to accept the economic reality that 
the goodwill of a professional practice has 
value, and it should be treated as property 
upon dissolution of the community, regard-
less of the form of business." MiUhell, 
732 P.2d at 212. We are mindful that not 
every professional practice necessarily has 
goodwill. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 
Hall, 692 P.2d at 179. Some courts, how-
ever, hold that sole proprietorships per se 
do not have goodwill because the busi-
ness's existence depends exclusively on the 
professional spouse's continuing efforts. 
See, e.g., Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 
(Tex. 1972). We are not prepared to rule so 
broadly. Instead, we emphasize that the 
issue is one of proof, and not the particular 
form the business takes. "It would be 
inequitable to hold that the form of the 
business enterprise can defeat the commu-
nity's interest in the professional goodwill. 
Such a result ignores the contribution made 
by the non-professional spouse to the suc-
cess of the professional " MiUhell, 
732 P.2d at 211. 
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Valuation of Goodwill 
Because we find that the goodwill of Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice was properly 
considered by the trial court in its property 
distribution, we next address Dr. Soren-
sen's contention that the trial court erred in 
the value it ultimately placed on the good-
will of his dental practice. 
[4] "It is a difficult task at best to 
arrive at a value for the intangible compo-
nent of a professional practice attributable 
to goodwill" Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 
Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 214 (1987). The 
valuation of goodwill is a question of fact 
and is dependent upon the particular cir-
cumstances.22 In order to establish that 
the goodwill of a divorcing spouse's profes-
sional practice is a marital asset, a party 
must produce sufficient expert testimony 
to show that the goodwill constitutes a 
valued business asset, independent of the 
continued presence of the professional 
spouse.23 Trial courts may consider any 
legitimate valuation method "that mea-
sures the present value of goodwill by tak-
ing into account past results, and not post-
marital efforts of the professional 
spouse " Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C.App. 
414, 331 S.E.2d 266, 271 (1985). 
Factors courts have frequently found to 
affect the value of goodwill include: 
(Tjhe age, health, and professional repu-
tation of the practitioner, the nature of 
the practice, the length of time the prac-
tice has been in existence, its past prof-
its, its comparative professional success, 
and the value of its other assets.24 
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
observed that the value of goodwill may be 
shown in a number of ways. " 'Elements 
which may be considered are, length oi 
time the business has been in existence; 
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the nature and character of the business; 
its success or lack thereof; its average 
profits; and the probability of its continu-
ance under the same name.' " In re Mar-
riage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 557 P.2d 
46, 47 (1976) (quoting Levene v. City of 
Salem, 191 Or. 182, 229 P.2d 255, 263 
(1951)). " 'Past profits may be established, 
and the value of the goodwill estimated 
therefrom as a basis, subject to being re-
duced by a showing of a depression in 
trade or other circumstances that would 
tend to make the business less valu-
a b l e . . . . ' " Id. 
[5] Trial courts should make specific 
findings, first indicating whether goodwill 
exists under the particular circumstances 
of the case, and if so, its value. Findings 
should clearly state the evidence upon 
which the valuations are based, and prefer-
ably, the valuation method or methods on 
which the court relied. See Poore v. 
Poore, 75 N.C.App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, 
272 (1985). 
[6] We emphasize, however, one factor 
that clearly should not be considered in the 
valuation of goodwill is the professional 
spouse's future earning capacity. Consist-
ent with our position that professional de-
grees are not assets capable of distribution, 
we similarly hold that the future earning 
capacity of the divorcing professional 
should not be considered. To consider fu-
ture earning capacity in the valuation of 
the professional corporation's goodwill 
would have the effect of double counting, 
as earning capacity is also utilized in deter-
mining an appropriate alimony award. 
See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 
(Utah 1985). 
[7,8] In this action, Mrs. Sorensen 
called Dr. Austin, an expert witness emi-
22. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 24. Poore, 331 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Hurley v. 
640, 647 (1987); Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz. 
296. 727 P.2d 349. 350 (Ct.App.1986). Accord 
Poore v. Poore, 75 N.CApp. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266 
(1985); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 
557 ?2d 46 (1976); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 
641, 615 P~2d 256 (1980). 
23. See Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721, 386 
N.W.2d 851, 858 (1986); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 
S.W^d 429, 434 (Mo.1987). 
Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980)); Ac-
cord In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 
557 P.2d 46 (1976). See also In re Marriage of 
Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 179 (1984); 
Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169, 1174 
(1983). 
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nently qualified to appraise dental practic-
es. Dr. Austin had practiced dentistry in 
Utah for approximately four and one-half 
years and worked for a firm which is in the 
business of appraising and selling dental 
practices. Dr. Austin's brokerage firm has 
been in business over eighteen years and 
sold more than 250 dental practices. Dr. 
Austin has personally been involved in 12 
appraisals and sold 6 practices in Utah. 
Based on financial information supplied 
by Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Austin determined 
that the goodwill value of the corporation 
was $62,560. The procedure employed by 
Dr. Austin is one commonly used by his 
brokerage firm, and is also consistent with 
the methodologies recognized and approved 
in other jurisdictions previously discussed 
herein.25 The goodwill figure was derived 
by considering factors such as a history of 
the corporation's earnings, the length of 
time Dr. Sorensen had been in practice, the 
number of his patients, the location of the 
practice, his facilities and equipment, ac-
counts receivable, and an evaluation of the 
transferability of profits to a prospective 
buyer. 
Dr. Austin further testified that the 
goodwill value of dental practices in Utah 
ranged from 15 to 80 percent of their gross 
receipts. Accordingly, based on an analy-
sis of the factors previously described, Dr. 
Austin calculated a 34 percent factor for 
goodwill and then reduced Dr. Sorensen's 
average gross receipts by 66 percent The 
34 percent goodwill factor was on the low 
end of the 15 to 80 percent which he testi-
fied had been used by his brokerage corpo-
ration to value and sell other Utah dental 
practices. 
To refute Dr. Austin's valuation, Dr. Sor-
ensen called Mr. Deters, his accountant, 
and Mr. Nuttal, a CPA. Neither witness 
demonstrated expertise in appraising den-
tal practices, and their testimony was virtu-
ally nonresponsive on the issue of a profes-
25. Although not specifically stated by either par-
ty, Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a market 
value methodology to value Dr. Sorensen's den-
tal practice. A market value approach has been 
cited with approval in other jurisdictions, see, 
e.g., In re Marriage of Hall 103 Washed 236, 
692 P.2d 175, 180 (1987); and in at least one 
sional corporation's goodwill. The trial 
court apparently chose to believe Dr. Aus-
tin, and we will not disturb the trial court's 
factual findings unless they are clearly er-
roneous. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). A trial 
court's fundamental role in the adversary 
process is to judge the credibility of wit-
nesses and he or she is free to choose 
among expert testimony. See Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). See also Lockwood v. Lockwood, 
205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W.2d 636, 640 (1980). 
"[T]his court will give weight to the fact 
that the trial court observed the witnesses 
and their manner of testifying and accept-
ed one version of facts rather than the 
opposite." Id. 
Other jurisdictions have upheld a trial 
court choosing the testimony of one party's 
expert over the other's expert in the con-
text of valuing goodwill. See, e.g., Ko-
walesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich.App. 151, 
384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986); In re Mar-
riage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Mont 
1986); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 808 
(Del.Fam.Ctl983). In Wright, the Dela-
ware Court indicated that one of the impor-
tant considerations for its decision to ac-
cept one expert's testimony was that the 
husband's expert had never been involved 
in the sale or liquidation of like practices. 
469 A.2d at 808 (emphasis added). Similar-
ly, in Kowalesky, a case involving the valu-
ation of a dental practice, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's 
valuation, which seemed to favor the plain-
tiff, was not clearly erroneous. The trial 
court's valuation was based on the plain-
tiffs expert testimony, and the appellate 
court noted that plaintiffs expert was "ac-
tively involved in the sale of dental prac-
tices and the valuation of those practic-
es." 384 N.W.2d at 115 (emphasis added). 
In Kowalesky, the court stated: "[defen-
dant's expert, a certified public accountant 
who has a number of dentists as clients, did 
jurisdiction, is the only acceptable methodology. 
See Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 435 
(Mo. 1987). Of the five methodologies, a market 
value approach often produces the most con-
servative estimate for goodwill. 2 Valuation 
and Distribution of Marital Property, 
§ 23.05(2][a] at 23-^ So (1988). 
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not have similar valuation experience [as 
plaintiffs expert]." Id, 
We find these cases analogous. Dr. Aus-
tin has considerable experience in the valu-
ation and sale of dental practices. Con-
versely, Dr. Sorensen's experts both can-
didly admitted that they were not involved 
in the sale and valuation of dental practic-
es. 
Our able colleague in dissent takes a 
novel approach to the review of expert 
testimony. He goes even further than re-
jecting the expert found more credible by 
the trial court and adopting another. He 
gives his own "expert" opinion on the valu-
ation of Dr. Sorensen's professional corpo-
ration, ignoring the testimony of all the 
experts and the findings of the trial judge. 
We think he simply believes that as a mat-
ter of law, the goodwill of any professional 
association should not be valued and dis-
tributed in a divorce action. We believe 
the overwhelming authority is to the con-
trary. 
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial 
court's valuation of the goodwill of Dr. 
Sorensen's practice, relying on the testimo-
ny of Dr. Austin, was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Accounts Receivable 
[9] Dr. Sorensen claims that the trial 
court improperly considered accounts re-
ceivable in the valuation of his dental prac-
tice. We disagree. 
Dr. Sorensen relies on Dogu v. Dogu, 652 
P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). In Dogu, the trial 
court excluded $25,000 of accounts receiva-
ble in its consideration of the value of the 
defendant's professional corporation. 
Finding the trial court had not abused its 
discretion, the Utah Supreme Court sum-
marily stated "[t]he corporation's accounts 
receivable represent deferred income from 
which respondent may meet his ongoing 
26. See, e.g.t Kopplin v. Kopplin, 74 Or-App. 368, 
703 ?2d 251, 253 (1985) (trial court did not err 
by discounting accounts receivable by 30 per-
cent); In re Marriage of Reiling, 66 Or.App. 284, 
673 P.2d 1360. 1365 (1983) (accounts receivable 
are property to be included in the valuation of a 
law firm); In re Marriage of Bayer, 687 ?2d 
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alimony and child support obligations to 
appellant" Id, at 1309. 
We are not persuaded that this state-
ment from Dogu stands for the proposition 
that accounts receivable may never be con-
sidered in the valuation of a professional 
corporation. Dr. Sorensen has not cited 
additional authority for this proposition, 
and we note other jurisdiction's commonly 
hold that accounts receivable may be con-
sidered in the property distribution.2* In 
fact, the Michigan Court of Appeal conclud-
ed that the trial court committed reversible 
error by failing to consider accounts re-
ceivable in its valuation of a dental prac-
tice. Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich. 
App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986). 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the 
trial court properly considered accounts re-
ceivable in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice. 
Accounts Payable 
[10] Dr. Sorensen claims that Dr. Aus-
tin's valuation, which was apparently 
adopted by the trial court, failed to consid-
er $10,129 in accounts payable. The record 
is ambiguous on this point, but even if the 
full amount of the accounts payable was 
not considered, we find the error was 
harmless. 
Both parties to this action were awarded 
approximately $131,000 in marital assets. 
Property distributions in divorce actions 
need not be "equal" but rather "equitable." 
See generally Berger v, Berger, 713 P.2d 
695 (Utah 1985). "While equality is a wor-
thy goal, precise mathematical equality is 
not essential or required." Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). Accordingly, we find that even if 
the trial court failed to consider the full 
amount of accounts payable in its calcula-
tions, such a mistake was harmless error 
considering the total property distribution. 
537, 538 (Colo.CtApp.1984) (accounts receivable 
represent debts for services already rendered 
and therefore constitute marital property); In re 
Marriage of Goldstein, 120 Ariz. 23, 583 P.2d 
1343, 1344 (1978) (trial court properly included 
accounts receivable as a marital asset). 
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Conclusion 
Based on Dr. Austin's testimony, the tri-
al court found that Dr. Sorensen's practice 
was worth $100,000 which included tangi-
ble assets, accounts receivable, and good-
will. The trial court further found that 
dental practices sell for approximately 90 
percent of their value, hence $90,000 was 
designated as the total value of the prac-
tice. The trial court then discounted this 
figure to account for the time the parties 
were married. The trial court found that 
Dr. Sorensen had been practicing for six-
teen years, and the parties had been mar-
ried for approximately eleven and one-half 
years. He further concluded the majority 
of the goodwill value of the practice had 
been established during the marriage.27 
Thus, he reduced or multiplied 11.5/16 or 
69 percent by $90,000 to arrive at $62,100, 
the total value he assigned Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice as a marital asset 
Having concluded, 1) the trial court prop-
erly considered accounts receivable and 
goodwill in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice, and 2) that failing to con-
sider accounts payable in its entirety was 
harmless error, we find the trial court's 
ultimate valuation of Dr. Sorensen's pro-
fessional dental corporation is supported by 
the record, and accordingly, the trial 
court's valuation is affirmed. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES 
[11,121 In order to recover attorney 
fees in a divorce action, the moving party 
must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating 
that the award is reasonable, and 2) estab-
lishing the financial need of the requesting 
party compels the award.28 The relevant 
factors for determining the reasonableness 
27. Although the record docs not conclusively 
establish that the goodwill value of Dr. Soren-
sen's practice increased at a constant rate 
throughout the marriage, there is also no con-
troverting evidence establishing that it did not 
In fact, Dr. Sorensen presented very little credi-
ble testimony regarding the goodwill value of 
his corporation. Based on the evidence before 
the trial court, its method of apportionment was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
of the request include, the necessity for the 
nufnber of hours dedicated, the reasonable-
ness of the rate charged in light of the 
difficulty of the case and the result accom-
plished, and the rates commonly charged 
for similar services in the community.25 
In the instant case, there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate Mrs. Sorensen's 
financial need. However, counsel for Mrs. 
Sorensen concedes that no evidence was 
offered regarding the "reasonableness" of 
the attorney fees incurred to maintain this 
action. Instead, Mrs. Sorensen's attorney 
proffered an exhibit reflecting only the 
tinie spent and the rates charged. Dr. 
Sorensen's counsel stipulated that the prof-
fer* could be received, but expressly re-
fused to stipulate to the "reasonableness" 
of the fees. No evidence was presented 
relating to the reasonableness of the num-
ber of hours, the usual hourly rate for 
divorce cases in the community, nor the 
overall reasonableness of the fee. See Tal-
ley, 739 P.2d at 84. Additionally, the 
court's written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as well as the decree of di-
vorce, make no reference to the reasonable-
ness of the fees. Accordingly, we find the 
proffered testimony insufficient to sustain 
the award of attorney fees, and therefore, 
we reverse. 
III. EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
[131 Ordinarily, a trial court cannot re-
quire one party to pay the other party's 
expert witness fees in excess of the statu-
tory rate.3* Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 
1384 (Utah 1980). See also Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). 
However, in this case the parties agreed by 
pretrial stipulation to have their real prop-
i s . Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 
1980); Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). 
29. Kerr, 610 ?2d at 1384-85; Talley, 739 P.2d at 
54. 
30. Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4(1) (1988). provides 
that "(ejvery witness legally required or in good 
faith requested to attend . . . [trial], is entitled to 
$14 per day for each day in attendance and 30 
cents for each mile actually and necessarily 
traveled in going only." 
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erty appraised by Mr. Heiskanan. They 
further agreed that his fee would be paid 
initially by Dr. Sorensen, with the ultimate 
responsibility for payment to be deter-
mined by the trial court Stipulations are 
conclusive and binding on the parties un-
less good cause is demonstrated warrant-
ing relief therefrom. Higley v. McDonald, 
685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). Dr. Soren-
sen has not set forth adequate justification 
to discharge his obligations under the pre-
trial stipulation. Simply because Dr. Sor-
ensen did not agree with the appraiser's 
valuation of the parties' real property, and 
instead chose to hire additional experts, 
does not constitute the requisite good 
cause. We find no abuse of discretion and 
affirm the trial court's allocation of the 
appraiser's fee. 
In sura, we affirm the trial court's valua-
tion and distribution of the parties' proper-
ty, and its allocation of expert witness fees. 
We reverse the award of attorney fees. 
GARFF, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring in part 
and dissenting in part): 
I dissent from Part I of the majority 
opinion. 
Why are my colleagues and others in the 
legal system trying to create "new proper-
ty" in the context of marriage dissolution? 
Because of real and perceived injustices 
and inequities in property settlements in 
divorce decrees. As a result of their high 
income production, professionals are prime 
targets for the new, expansive definitions 
of property that include: (1) advanced univ-
ersity degrees; (2) licenses to practice; (3) 
equitable restitution; and (4) professional 
goodwill. Proponents of "new property" 
justify new definitions because they believe 
those definitions provide the divorce sys-
tem with additional means to be fair. 
STATUS OF THE "NEW 
PROPERTY" IN UTAH 
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 
241 (Utah CtApp.1987), this court held that 
"an advanced degree is or confers an intan-
gible right which, because of its character, 
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cannot properly be characterized as proper-
ty subject to division between the spouses." 
We also stated it is proper to consider 
advanced degrees or professional licenses 
when determining a spouse's ability to pro-
vide support, because an advanced degree 
is ordinarily an indicator of potential future 
earnings. 
But it is the discrepancy in their earning 
power which is the basis for alimony, not 
the discrepancy in their educations 
Whether a spouse's ability to provide 
support is the result of an advanced de-
gree or professional license is irrelevant 
to the analysis. The key is the spouse's 
ability. 
Id, at 243 (emphasis in original). 
In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 
240-41 (Utah CtApp.1987), we reaffirmed 
our holding in Petersen, but acknowledged 
there will be situations involving advanced 
degrees and professional licenses where an 
award of non-terminable rehabilitative or 
reimbursement alimony would be appropri-
ate. See Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n. 4. In 
my view, reimbursement alimony is a re-
turn on investment in one spouse made by 
the financially supporting spouse. In con-
trast, rehabilitative alimony relates to lost 
investment in one's self, resulting in lost or 
lower future income stream. 
The need for reimbursement is most pro-
nounced in "threshold" divorces, where the 
parties split up before the benefits of one 
spouse's enhanced earning potential are re-
alized. Like Rayburn, the instant case 
does not involve a threshold divorce. Dr. 
Rayburn acquired his medical degree be-
fore the parties married. Mrs. Rayburn 
did not endure substantial financial sacri-
fices or defer her own education to assist 
his education. She shared the financial 
rewards of the degree for several years. 
His income production brought considera-
ble real and personal property into the mar-
riage that was equitably divided. 
Similarly, Dr. Sorensen acquired his de-
gree, license, and dental clientele and 
equipment six years before marriage. 
Mrs. Sorensen contributed nothing to assist 
him in those acquisitions; she made no 
sacrifice, financial or otherwise. She 
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shared his financial rewards for eleven 
years and received considerable tangible 
property in the divorce decree, plus alimo-
ny and chrid support If the facts had 
warranted it, she could have been awarded 
non-terminable rehabilitative or reimburse-
ment alimony. 
In another recent divorce case involving 
a professional spouse, Martinez v. Mar-
tinez, 754 P 2d 69 (Utah CtApp 1988), the 
majonty followed Petersen and Rayburn 
insofar as it held that a medical degree is 
not property subject to valuation and distri-
bution m a divorce. However, stating that 
Mrs. Martinez's situation required "more 
creative" analysis than the usual case, 
Martinez, 754 P.2d at 76, the majonty then 
moved beyond rehabilitative or reimburse-
ment alimony to create new property by 
requiring an award of "equitable restitu-
tion" in addition to traditional alimony and 
property division.1 See id. at 78. In a 
footnote, the majority emphasized that eq-
uitable restitution would not be awarded 
where the marriage lasted for many years 
after receipt of the professional degree; in 
such a case, sufficient assets would be 
accumulated and an appropriate distribu-
tion to the requesting spouse would provide 
a share of the economic benefits earned as 
a result of the degree Id. at 78 n. 10 
Equitable restitution, this new animal 
not to be confused with traditional alimony 
or property, was descnbed by the Martinez 
majonty as "nothing more than an eq-
uitable shanng of the rewards of both par-
ties' common efforts and expectations" 
Id. at 78. As I stated in my dissent, the 
effect of that decision is to unnecessanly 
create a distinctly new and unprecedented 
form of marital property Id. at 82 (Jack-
son, J., dissenting). 
The instant case is the fourth attempt in 
Utah to create "new property" in the pro-
fessional arena. My colleagues have coop-
erated by uncntically embracing a new def-
inition equating "goodwill" with "reputa-
tion," discussed below. I agree that we 
must strive for equity and fairness in di-
vorce actions, but I do not agree with the 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted Dr Mar 
tinez's petition for a wnt of certiorari to consid-
means they have chosen Under our stat-
ute, Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5 (1988), equi-
ty can be achieved through non-terminable 
alimony awards consistent with Rayburn 
and Petersen. This method is preferable to 
the judicial selection of new definibons of 
property. 
ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL 
GOODWILL 
Like many legal doctrines, that of profes-
sional goodwill as a mantal asset divisible 
at divorce had one of its earliest airings in 
the California appellate courts In Mueller 
v Mueller, 144 Cal App 2d 245, 301 P 2d 
90, 94-95 (1956), the Third Distnct Court of 
Appeal quoted what it believed to be the 
"general rule" in 28 Am J u r 808 that good-
will could exist m a professional practice or 
business dependent on the personal skill 
and ability of a particular person, but did 
not adopt that rule. The authonty relied 
on in Mueller, however, focused on an ac-
tual sale of a professional practice. In any 
case, the Mueller court disposed of the 
case by assuming no goodwill could attach 
to such a business and then holding that 
the dental laboratory business at issue did 
not depend solely on the divorcing hus-
band's personal skill. Six years later, the 
same court said—agam m dicta—that the 
value of a professional practice was proper-
ty to be considered at marriage dissolution, 
the appellant ex-wife had not even appealed 
the trial court's failure to award her any of 
the value of the respondent's law practice. 
Bravrman v Bravrman, 199 Cal.App.2d 
876, 19 Cal Rptr. 106, 109 (1962). Finally, 
relying on Mueller and Bravrman, the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal explicitly em-
braced the doctrine in Golden v. Golden, 
270 CaLApp 2d 401, 75 Cal.Rptr. 735 (1969), 
and stated the following rule* 
[I]n a divorce case, the good will of the 
husband's professional practice as a sole 
practitioner should be taken into consid-
eration in determining the award to the 
wife . [I]n a matrimonial matter, the 
practice of a sole practitioner husband 
will continue, with the same intangible 
cr the issue of equitable restitution Martinez v 
Martinez. 765 P2d 1277 (Utah 1988) 
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value as it had during the marriage. Un-
der the principles of community property 
law, the wife, by virtue of her position of 
wife, made to that value the same contri-
bution as does a wife to any of the hus-
band's earnings and accumulations dur-
ing marriage. 
Id. at 405, 75 Cal.Rptr. at 737-38. The 
California cases involving professional 
goodwill after Golden did not even argue 
about whether goodwill can exist in a pro-
fessional practice. Instead, they assumed 
both that such goodwill could and did in 
fact exist, and focused on how to put a 
price tag on it E.g., In re Marriage of 
Fortier, 34 Cal.App.3d 384, 109 Cal.Rptr. 
915 (1973); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 
Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 (1974); In 
re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal.App.3d 577, 
117 Cal.Rptr. 49 (1974). As discussed more 
fully below, this shift in focus has two 
unfortunate results: (1) the use of a broad, 
new definition of "goodwill," only in the 
professional practice context, that equates 
it with personal reputation; and (2) the 
assumption that goodwill exists in every 
professional practice, relieving the request-
ing party of the burden of proving that it 
exists. 
Tracking the elevation of professional 
goodwill from dicta to law in California, 
one writer has summarized: 
Thus in just 17 years . . . California 
carried a passing quotation from a law 
encyclopedia that goodwill now could be 
sold as part of a professional practice, to 
a clear acceptance, in Fortier, that pro-
fessional goodwill was an asset accounta-
ble as property upon a hypothetical sale 
at marriage dissolution. 
Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Mar-
riage Dissolution: Is it Property or An-
other Name for Alimony?, 52 CaLState 
Bar J. 27, 82 (1977). The result, Lurvey 
claims, is a "confusion of rules and meth-
ods for valuation, compounded by inconsist-
encies in logic and application and concep-
tual problems over possible duplication of 
2. This approach, which begs the preliminary 
question of existence, is similar to that adopted 
by the Arizona court in Mitchell v. Mitchell 152 
Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 214 (1987), despite rec-
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spousal support and denial of equal protec-
tion." Id. at 85. 
EXISTENCE OF 
PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL 
Judges, like valuation formulas, are 
leapfrogging over the threshold question of 
whether goodwill exists at all in a particu-
lar professional business, moving directly 
to the issue of what the value of that 
goodwill is. The court in In re Marriage 
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 
(1984), takes a stab at existence first, valu-
ation second, but ultimately caves in and 
comingles the two issues: 
Two areas surrounding the [factors rele-
vant to valuation of goodwill, set out in 
In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App.3d 
93, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 (1974) and adopted in 
In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 
324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979),] must be clari-
fied: (1) the first step in evaluation [of 
goodwill] under the Fleege factors is the 
determination of the existence of good-
will and (2) several accounting or ap-
praisal methods may be used by the trial 
court in conjunction with the Fleege 
factors. 
The Lopez court warned that evalua-
tion of goodwill must be done with con-
siderable care and caution. In carrying 
out this warning the court instructed 
that the trial courts should first deter-
mine if goodwill exists in a particular 
practice. Not every professional busi-
ness as a going concern necessarily has 
goodwill. The Washington goodwill 
cases to date have not recognized this 
preliminary inquiry and we do so today. 
Hall, 692 P.2d at 179 (citations omitted). 
Unfortunately, the Hall court then states, 
'This preliminary inquiry takes place dur-
ing the general evaluation process. The 
trial court must bear in mind that there 
may be zero goodwill." Id. Thus, even 
after Hall, the existence of goodwill is 
going to be determined by a calculation or 
formula determining whether it has a val-
ue; if it has a value, then it exists.2 "One 
ognition of the need for a two-step determina-
tion: 
As a general rule, "the court should clearly 
state whether it finds the practice to have any 
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or more [approved valuation] methods may 
be used in conjunction with the Fleege 
factors to achieve a just and fair evaluation 
of the existence and value of any profes-
sional's goodwill." Id 692 P2d at 180. 
The Fleege factors referred to in Hall, 692 
P.2d at 179, which are also the factors set 
forth in Lopez, are the professional's age, 
health, past demonstrated earning power, 
professional reputation in the community 
as to his judgments, skill, and knowledge3 
and his comparative professional success. 
But these are the factors outlined in Fleege 
and Lopez as relevant to the valuation of 
professional goodwill, not its existence. 
See Fleege, 588 P 2d at 1138, Lopez, 38 
Cal.App.3d at 109, 113 Cal.Rptr. at 68 
Thus, after this bit of sleight of hand in 
Hall, Washington uses the same factors to 
determine both that professional goodwill 
exists and that it has some value. Then 
the amount of that value is determined 
with the aid of an expert who is to use one 
of the five approved formulas. According-
ly, goodwill exists when a professional has 
health, a financial track record, and reputa-
goodwtll, and if so, its value, and how it 
arrived at that value" Poore v. Poore, 75 
N.CApp. 414. 331 SE.2d 266 (1985) How 
ever, because the trial court stated that it 
utilized the gross fee approach advocated by 
appellee's own expert, and the valuation was 
reasonably supported in the record by expert 
testimony, we find no error 
3. Fleege states that the value of professional 
goodwill can be determined based partially on 
the professional's "reputation in the community 
for judgment, skill, and knowledge" Fleege, 
588 P 2d at 1138 But the case it cites as author 
ity for the elements engendering goodwill. In re 
Estate of Giant, 57 Wash 2d 309. 356 PJ2d 707, 
709 (I960), involved Pacific Iron and Metal 
Company, a business partnership, and referred 
only to "reputaUon for honesty and fair deal-
ing." 
4. Significantly, the primary reason Dr. Sorensen 
would have the "new goodwill" is because he 
elected to work for himself as a non-salaried 
professional rather than work for someone else 
for a salary For example, assume a lawyer in 
solo practice who has five winnable wrongful 
death cases on hand. When he wins or settles 
those cases, the "new goodwillers" attribute 
goodwill to him because he will have excess 
earnings above what the average salaried lawyer 
makes. However, if he were to take his cases to 
another lawyer or firm, turn them over, and 
agree to work on them for a high salary until 
tion. Thus, every professional who does 
not work as a salaried employee4 automati-
cally has goodwill because every profes-
sional has all or most of these factors. 
My colleagues in this case adopt the Cali-
fornia and Washington approach and make 
the same unfortunate mistake. Their posi-
tion, boiled down, is that a non-salaried 
professional person's reputation is "good-
will" and, therefore, property. Failing to 
discern the necessity of a preliminary fac-
tual finding, based on supportive evidence 
in the record, that such professional good-
will exists, the majority opinion jumps right 
into valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice. 
In California, the professional goodwill 
doctrine found its roots in dicta. Here, my 
colleagues think they have found identical 
roots in dicta in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner, how-
ever, Justice Stewart was concerned that 
the parties' experts had failed to address 
the goodwill of an established business or-
successfuily completed, he would not have any 
"new goodwill" as property to be divided upon 
divorce, although his high income is virtually 
the same. 
The court in Hall reached this absurd result, 
professing to see a distinction with a difference 
between salaried and non salaried profession-
als Dr Judith Hall, a forty-year-old professor 
at the University of Washington, had received a 
salary increase from $32,750 to $42,000 around 
the time of the divorce. She was "widely pub-
lished and enjoyfed] a reputation as one of the 
10 top physicians in the nation in the Held of 
pediatric genetics . Numerous medical 
schools across the nation ha[d] offered her em-
ployment with salaries up to $60,000." Hall 
692 P2d at 176. The Washington Supreme 
Court held, as a matter of law, that a salaried 
employee such as Judith Hall cannot have good-
will. Id at 178 But see L. Weitzman, The 
Divorce Revolution 122 (1985) (suggesting the 
California courts and others have already laid 
the necessary foundation for finding "goodwill" 
in salaried employees too) The Hall court ap-
parently reached this conclusion because "only 
the practicing professional has a business or 
practice to which the goodwill can attach." 
Hall 692 P.2d at 178. Was not Judith Hall a 
practicing professional? Did she not, like her 
physician husband who worked for a profes-
sional corporation, also have health, reputation 
for skill and knowledge, and comparative pro-
fessional success? 
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ganization, the Ogden Clinic, not the per-
sonal reputation of Mr. Gardner 
The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. Gard-
ner is a member, is a well-entrenched 
institution, whose twenty-three members 
have banded together in a business orga-
nization. It is not likely to be highly 
susceptible to earnings interruptions be-
cause of the ill health of one of its mem-
bers. The Ogden Clinic is not entirely 
valueless Mrs. Gardner's account-
ants value the business much higher 
[than Mr. Gardner does]. Neither gave 
consideration to the good will inherent in 
the professional clinic 
Id at 1080 (footnote omitted). The foot-
note to this text also clearly refers to good-
will as an asset of a business, not of a 
person. 'The ability of a business to gen-
erate income from its continued patronage 
is commonly referred to as good will." Id 
at 1080 n. 1. 
The twenty-three member Ogden Clinic 
is the perfect contrast to Dr. Sorensen's 
one-man dental practice, which is highly 
susceptible to earnings interruptions from 
many causes. Moreover, when well, he can 
work only so many hours a day and that is 
the end of his production. His opportuni-
ties to increase earnings are negligible. 
As the court in Gardner seems to recog-
nize, traditional nonlegal definitions of 
goodwill focus on it as the asset of a busi-
ness, not of an individual. The goodwill 
concept used by accountants focuses on its 
measurement through a deductive process, 
not on its nature. Parkman, The Treat-
ment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce 
Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984). 
Thus, their criteria for goodwill are aimed 
at something that can be measured, such 
as excess earning power or payments made 
in excess of an established value of a re-
source. Id To economists, the value of an 
5. Professor Allen Parkman, an economist and 
lawyer who teaches at the University of New 
Mexico's Anderson School of Management, at-
tributes the confusion in the case law to the lack 
of any focus on a clear definition of goodwill, 
which the majority opinion in this case shares. 
The courts can obviously define terms in a 
manner that differs from their meaning in 
accounting and economics. However, if they 
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asset depends on the future profits it can 
produce. Thus, the economic concept of 
goodwill focuses on the fact that an estab-
lished business can make greater profits 
than new businesses because of its internal 
and external relationships; once the reve-
nue produced by these relationships is capi-
talized, it can be viewed as an asset of the 
business, i.e., goodwill. Id at 214. 
In contrast, the legal concept of goodwill 
focuses on the idea that it is an asset 
which generates excess earnings. Be-
cause the legal concept has not been 
fitted into the existing accounting and 
economic framework, however, experts 
have had a difficult time applying the 
concept In particular, the legal concept 
does not clearly differentiate between ex-
cess returns to individuals and excess 
returns to businesses. This confusion is 
especially noticeable in the case of pro-
fessional practices. 
In both the accounting and economic 
literature, goodwill is an asset of a busi-
ness based on earnings in excess of nor-
mal profits. It is based on the intangi-
ble, but generally marketable, existence 
in a business of established relations 
with employees, customers, and suppli-
ers. The same analysis would not view 
goodwill as being reflected in an individ-
ual. If excess profits of a business are 
attributable to an individual, that individ-
ual should be able to capture that value 
in higher wages. It would be appropri-
ate to view personal attributes as "repu-
tation" rather than as "goodwill." By 
using reputation and goodwill inter-
changeably, the courts have created a 
confused situation in the evaluation of 
professional businesses. 
Id at 215.5 
In a professional practice, goodwill can 
exist in the business, but not in the individ-
then turn to these fields for an evaluation, 
they have to realize the confusion that is go-
ing to be created. If the courts say that there 
is goodwill in a sole practice, when there is 
none from an accounting or economic per-
spective, a problem of evaluation is created. 
It is like saying that an apple is an orange and 
then, even in the face of protests from an 
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ual practicing the profession. A large pro-
fessional business organization can have 
substantial goodwill. The Ogden Clinic fits 
the example of such an organization given 
by Parkman. See idL at 216. It does not 
have any one professional's name directly 
associated with it; patients come not be-
cause of any particular individual profes-
sional, but because of their own needs and 
the clinic's past delivery of high quality 
service. If that clinic sold for a price 
greater than the value of its tangible as-
sets, the value of that excess, goodwill, 
would not be based on the presence at the 
clinic of any particular employee or profes-
sional. 
Dr. Sorensen's solo dental practice fits 
Parkman's example, at the other extreme, 
of the limited opportunities for goodwill in 
a small professional practice, even one that 
is smoothly operated. See id. His patients 
come because of high quality service. He 
has a few employees, but equally qualified 
people are readily available. Patients 
would not necessarily return to his office 
location just because they had gone to a 
doctor there before. A new doctor would 
not pay for his practice much in excess of 
the value of his tangible assets and ac-
counts receivable. 
By distorting the original definition of 
business goodwill to equate it with such 
subjective factors as personal reputation in 
the professional practice context, the ma-
jority's decision, like the cases it relies on, 
fabricates the existence of goodwill as as 
asset belonging to every non-salaried pro-
fessional, whether in a solo practice, part-
nership, or professional corporation. I be-
lieve an objective threshold standard for 
determining the existence of goodwill must 
be enunciated. 
agricultural expert, asking for an analysis of 
the apple's citrus content. 
Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Good-
will in Divorce Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213, 
216 (1984). 
6. Even this "past sales'* method of valuing pro-
fessional goodwill has been criticized as subject 
to manipulation and not necessarily accurate, 
see e.g., 2 Valuation and Distribution of Marital 
ANALYSIS OF VALUATION METHODS 
AND FORMULAS APPLIED TO 
"NEW" GOODWILL 
The majority asserts that the valuation 
procedure employed by Dr. Austin, Mrs. 
Sorensen's expert, is one commonly used 
by his brokerage firm and is also consistent 
with methodologies recognized and ap-
proved in other jurisdictions. But they are 
not sure about the method he employed: 
"Although not specifically stated by either 
party, Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a 
market value methodology to value Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice. A market val-
ue approach has been cited with approval in 
other jurisdictions, see, eg., In re Marriage 
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 180 
(1984)...." Footnote 25, supra. Actually, 
Dr. Austin used his own gross revenue 
capitalization formula and merely labeled 
his method a "market value" approach. 
Gross revenue formulas automatically at-
tribute goodwill to every professional be-
cause every professional has revenue. 
In Hall, the Washington Supreme Court 
approved five professional goodwill valua-
tion methods, including three capitalization 
formulas based on capitalization of net 
profits, not of gross revenue. In this case, 
Austin did not use the market value meth-
od, described by the court in Hall as fol-
lows: 
The fourth method, the market value 
approach, sets a value on professional 
goodwill by establishing what fair price 
would be obtained in the current open 
market if the practice were to be sold. 
This method necessitates that a -profes-
sional practice has been recently sold, 
is in the process of being sold or is the 
subject of a recent offer to purchase. 
Hall, 692 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added).' 
Thus, although Hall approves only a 
market value approach based on a current 
Property § 23.05[2](a) at 25-66 (J. McCahey ed. 
1988), prompting some courts to insist on the 
use of accounting formulas that capitalize ex-
cess earnings. These, however, have their own 
faults, including the problem of estimating a 
consistent "normal" return on tangible assets by 
which to measure "excess" earnings and the 
broad leeway given to the appraiser to choose a 
capitalization rate. Id. § 29.05{3][c] at 29-44, 
45. 
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sale of the particular practice at issue, Aus-
tin used a past sales approach that only 
involved six sales of other practices, sales 
generated by his appraisal firm at prices 
created by its methods. The number of 
sales (two each year for three years) is too 
few to establish any market and none were 
in the vicinity of Roy, Utah or Weber Coun-
ty, Utah. They are too remote in both time 
and place to be reliable indicators of the 
value of any goodwill in Dr. Sorensen's 
practice. 
Unlike the majority, I believe courts 
should not be hoodwinked into accepting 
the valuation testimony offered by one par-
ty or the other, just because one sounds 
more credible than the other. If both ex-
perts are out in left field, the court should 
ignore them or require counsel to provide 
the proper data and analysis. 
FAILURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
THE PROFESSIONAL'S CAREER 
ASSET WAS ACQUIRED BEFORE 
MARRIAGE 
Even if there was evidence in this case 
on which to base a finding that goodwill 
exists in Dr. Sorensen's dental practice, 
and even if there was credible evidence to 
support the value of that goodwill, there is 
It is important to note that there is a great 
deal of diverse opinion as to whether earnings 
from a professional practice should be capi-
talized at all and if so, what rate is applicable. 
Critics of the use of capitalization point out 
that a generally accepted accounting and ap-
praisal principle is that earnings are to be 
capitalized only where it can be assumed they 
will continue in the future. In the context of 
a professional practice, therefore, a court em-
ploying the formula approach is, either direct-
ly or implicitly, placing a value on future 
earnings and results. Yet, courts are, often 
without adequate explanation, quick to point 
out that they are not so doing. 
Id. § 29.05{3][c] at 29-46 (footnote omitted). 
Often, the professional ends up paying for the 
new goodwill with future earnings. 
[Another] difficulty with these accounting for-
mulas [for valuing professional goodwill] is 
that the result may be inappropriately high 
since factors other than goodwill may contrib-
ute to the excess income. For instance, if a 
physician works 60 to 70 hours a week in-
stead of the usual 40 to 50, the excess earnings 
generated by this additional effort may be 
attributed to goodwill. 
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one remaining flaw in the property distri-
bution in this case. The trial court never 
examined—and none of the evidence ad-
dresses—whether the intangible asset of 
professional goodwill was acquired before 
or after the marriage vows. 
Here, the trial court did recognize a tim-
ing problem with the expert's valuation 
methods. Mrs. Sorensen's expert did not 
pay attention to the time when Dr. Soren-
sen acquired his reputation or "goodwill." 
The court found that *'[t]he only reasonable 
way to value said practice is to proportion 
it based upon the years the parties have 
been married during practice."7 There is 
no evidence to support that finding. To 
the contrary, there is evidence that virtual-
ly all, if not all, of the value of the practice, 
including goodwill or reputation, was Dr. 
Sorensen's pre-marital asset Dr. Soren-
sen's evidence showed that, when adjusted 
for inflation, net earnings from his profes-
sional services were essentially the same at 
the time of marriage as at the time of 
divorce. The number of his clients had 
decreased. Thus, there was no increase in 
the value of his goodwill or reputation dur-
ing the marriage. Whatever it was and 
whatever its value, it was Dr. Sorensen's 
Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing 
Professional Goodwill as Community Property at 
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tul.L. 
Rev. 313. 333-34 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
7. A question not yet brought before the 
courts is the issue of the existence of pre-mari-
tal goodwill when the practitioner spouse has 
married well after the commencement of his 
practice. This could become quite significant. 
For example, a professional who had been in 
practice for twenty or more years could mar-
ry and then dissolve the marriage a short time 
later. Presumably the value of the goodwill 
accrued as of the date of the marriage would 
be separate property and would form a sort of 
basis. Only the goodwill accrued during the 
marriage would be community property. Its 
value could be determined by calculating the 
difference between the value of goodwill as of 
the date of dissolution and the value as of the 
date of marriage. Since goodwill is not ac-
crued at a constant rate, as are pension bene-
fits, the application of a simple time-based 
percentage formula to the value on the date of 
dissolution would not suffice. 
Comment, supra note 6, at 340 (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis added). 
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pre-marital asset, not a marital asset8 
Since Dr. Sorensen owned his career as-
set, his practice, and its "goodwill" prior to 
marriage, that asset should be treated as 
his separate property, to be awarded to him 
at dissolution in the absence of exigent 
circumstances faced by the trial court in 
fashioning equitable awards of property, 
support, and alimony, circumstances not 
present here. See Preston v. Preston, 646 
P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982); see also Morten-
sen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 
1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, I dissent from my col-
leagues' creation of yet another species of 
new property through their broad redefini-
tion of goodwill in the professional practice 
context, and from their erroneous approval 
of valuation factors and an unacceptable 
valuation method as a substitute for evi-
dence of the existence of goodwill, however 
defined. Traditional alimony awards, plus 
nonmodifiable rehabilitative or reimburse-
ment alimony awards, where appropriate, 
offer the best methods for achieving equity 
and fairness in Utah. 
Even if I agreed with the majority's 
analysis and disposition of the professional 
goodwill issue, I would nonetheless vacate 
the trial court's award of part of the value 
8. Another method of analysis, recently set forth 
by Professor Parkman in a thought provoking 
law review article, better demonstrates that Dr 
Sorensen's income-producing ability was his, 
not theirs. See Parkman, The Recognition of 
Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settle-
ments, 40 Ark.L.Rev 439, 440-49 (1987) Dr 
Sorensen (or someone other than Mrs, Soren-
sen) made all the essential investments in the 
skill and knowledge he has that permits him to 
generate income in excess of the income he 
could derive from his innate strength and intel-
ligence. His investments in himself, which in 
creased the expected future income stream that 
would flow to him, were completed at least six 
years prior to his marriage Usually, 
the greatest impediment to attaining access to 
a professional education is probably not the 
direct costs of the education, but the difficulty 
of obtaining admission The ability to gain 
admission is the result of earlier human capi-
tal investments. After admission, the most 
substantial cost of graduate education is 
usually the income sacrificed by the student. 
to Mrs. Sorensen because there is no evi-
dence to justify not returning it to Dr 
Sorensen as his pre-marital asset 
- /w \ 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas Eugene DAVIS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 870221-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
Feb. 21, 1989 
Forgery arrestee sought return of 
money seized from his person pursuant to 
statute requiring prosecutor to return 
property which is not needed as evidence 
upon proof of ownership and lawfulness of 
possession. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Timothy R Hanson, J, re-
fused order to return, and forgery arrestee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J , 
held that: (1) State worked de facto forfei-
ture by retaining money for more than two 
Id. at 444-45 The current value of this income 
stream, his human capital, is a personal asset 
See id. at 440, 447 That asset has value precise 
ly because it will produce a stream of future 
returns. Id. at 439-40 & n 4 Even in a closer 
case, where a professional married while still a 
medical student, Parkman advocates treatment 
of an investment in one's self as non marital 
property* 
For a medical doctor, the major increase in 
his future anticipated income stream occurs 
when he enters medical school, because the 
probability is very high that he will finish. 
(T]he critical investments had already oc 
curred when the student entered medical 
school 
Under normal circumstances, the invest-
ment in human capital prior to mamage will 
be so large and essenual relative to the invest 
ment after mamage that an individual's hu 
man capital should be treated as separate 
property 
Id. at 448 
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